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INTRODUCTION
When we think about administrative law, we tend to dwell on
issues related to federal agencies and the federal laws and institutions that
govern those agencies.1 But the federal government is only one part of a
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. I am
very grateful to Bob Williams for helpful comments on this article. I am also
grateful to the Belmont Law Review for inviting me to contribute to this important
symposium and for their careful editing work.
1. See Arthur Earl Bonfield, State Law in the Teaching of Administrative
Law: A Critical Analysis of the Status Quo, 61 TEX. L. REV. 95, 95 (1982) (“While
administrative law professors would generally acknowledge that state law should
be a part of their subject, few actually consider state administrative law issues or
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much larger regulatory structure in the United States. State agencies are a
significant and crucial component of the contemporary regularly regime.2
State boards of agriculture, for example, influence international trade
policy, food safety rules, emerging crops regulation, and the
implementation of multi-billion dollar federal farming programs.3 State
departments of education likewise have wide-ranging impacts on education
policy,4 while state health and human services departments regulate
healthcare and intimate family relationships.5 In short, state agencies are
pervasive and powerful, and they deserve more focused scholarly attention.
This is especially true because although state agencies perform
functions analogous to federal agencies (i.e., they promulgate rules,
adjudicate disputes, and monitor private actors),6 they perform those
functions in a very different institutional environment.7 John Devlin has
argued, for example, that federal administrative law is ill suited to the states
because of a variety of structural differences between state and federal
government.8 Aaron Saiger has similarly argued that the federal Chevron
doctrine “is a poor candidate” for adoption by state courts.9 And important
recent work by Miriam Seifter has demonstrated that state agency
independence does not fit cleanly within the federal archetype10 and that
federal models of civil society oversight may be weaker in the states.11
materials in their courses.”).
2. See generally GARY F. MONCRIEF & PEVERILL SQUIRE, WHY STATES
MATTER: AN INTRODUCTION TO STATE POLITICS 77–143 (2d. ed. 2017) (discussing
state government policymaking capacity).
3. The National Association of State Departments of Agriculture provides a
helpful overview of the role of state agriculture departments in the states. See
NASDA, Policy Statements (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.nasda.org/policy/nasdapolicy-statements [https://perma.cc/EE9M-9HKH] (last visited Dec. 2, 2020).
4. See Edmund T. Hamann & Brett Lane, The Roles of State Departments of
Education as Policy Intermediaries: Two Cases, 18 EDUC. POL’Y 426 (2004).
5. See, e.g., New Jersey Department of Children and Families Act, S. 2069
(2006) (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3A-1–9:3A-18 (West 2006)) (endowing
New Jersey Department of Children and Families with responsibility to monitor
well-being of children and intervene in family affairs when necessary).
6. See Katherine Shaw, State Administrative Constitutionalism, 69 ARK. L.
REV. 527, 532 (2016).
7. See Parcell v. Kansas, 468 F. Supp. 1274, 1277 (D. Kan. 1979) (holding
that federal and state separation of powers cases cannot be used interchangeably),
aff’d sub nom. Parcell v. Governmental Ethics Comm'n, 639 F.2d 628 (10th Cir.
1980).
8. See generally John Devlin, Toward a State Constitutional Analysis of
Allocation of Powers: Legislators and Legislative Appointees Performing
Administrative Functions, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1205, 1220 (1993) (discussing
separation of powers principles).
9. Aaron Saiger, Chevron and Deference in State Administrative Law, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 555, 557 (2014).
10. See Miriam Seifter, Understanding State Agency Independence, 117
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In this Article, I argue that there is a more fundamental difference
between state and federal regulatory environments that has been largely
overlooked in the study of state administrative law. My core claim is that
state constitutional amendments affect state agencies in significant but
underappreciated ways that have no reliable analog in the federal context.
This in turn suggests that we should be especially cautious when using
federal theories and doctrines to evaluate or conceptualize state agencies.
I advance two main arguments in support of this claim. First, state
constitutional theory differs significantly from federal constitutional theory,
and creates the expectation that constitutional amendment plays a unique
and important role in monitoring state agencies. Federal agencies operate
within the context of the Federal Constitution’s deep commitment to
representative democracy and the separation of powers as strategies for
promoting government accountability.12 Within this structure, federal
agencies present a puzzle because of their distance from elections, their
unusual independence from other branches of government, and their
authority to perform legislative, executive, and judicial functions.13 Federal
administrative law and theory is largely dedicated to explaining agency
legitimacy and accountability within this constitutional structure.14
State constitutional theory, however, is grounded in a very different
set of assumptions regarding government accountability.15 State
constitutions reflect a pervasive fear that government officials and
institutions are prone towards capture and recalcitrance, and demonstrate a
deep skepticism of representative government and the separation of powers
as accountability solutions.16 Consequently, state constitutions have been
MICH. L. REV. 1537 (2019).
11. Miriam Seifter, Further from the People? The Puzzle of State
Administration, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 107 (2018).
12. See infra Section I.A; see also Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving
Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 518–20 (2015) (noting that the
separation of powers strategy persists, albeit in different forms, within the federal
government in order to protect against the consolidation of power and the
undermining of democracy).
13. See Jacob E. Gersen, Unbundled Powers, 96 VA. L. REV. 301, 305–07
(2010).
14. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 578 (1984); see also Jon
D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An Account of
the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 227, 227–30 (2016).
15. Two classic works demonstrating the alternative assumptions and
strategies underlying state constitutions are GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787 (Univ. of N.C. Press 1998) (1969), and
DONALD S. LUTZ, POPULAR CONSENT AND POPULAR CONTROL: WHIG POLITICAL
THEORY IN THE EARLY STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1980).
16. See G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 78 (1998);
G. Alan Tarr, For the People: Direct Democracy in the State Constitutional
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constructed around alternative mechanisms for promoting government
accountability; most notably, various forms of direct democracy that allow
the public to intervene in government.17
The states have institutionalized direct democracy in a variety of
ways, but contemporary state constitutionalism is deeply tied to frequent
formal amendment of constitutional text through popular political processes
as a key mechanism for promoting government accountability.18 Indeed,
the states have steadily and universally liberalized amendment procedures
to encourage frequently popular input and control over government policies
and decisions.19 As a result, state constitutions contain myriad provisions
addressing almost every aspect of contemporary society, often with
statutory-like detail. Although these provisions can appear chaotic and
disconnected, they accurately reflect the deep structure of state
constitutionalism, which encourages popular entrenchment of detailed
policy as a mechanism for promoting government accountability.20
It is within this broader theoretical context that state agencies
should be evaluated and conceptualized. Unlike their federal counterparts,
state agencies do not operate within a constitutional framework that relies
primarily on representative democracy and the separation of powers to
ensure accountability. Instead, they sit within a constitutional structure
where frequent popular intervention in policymaking and administration is
a dominant accountability device. Thus, if we assume that state
constitutional “amendomania” reflects an effort by the public to control and
Tradition, in DEMOCRACY: HOW DIRECT? VIEWS FROM THE FOUNDING ERA AND
THE POLLING ERA 87, 89–90 (Elliot Abrams ed. 2002) [hereinafter Tarr, For the
People]. This fear is prolific in state constitutional convention debates regarding a
variety of topics. See, e.g., INDIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1850–51, 683
(Delegate John Morrison: “It is a notorious fact, mortifying as it may be to our
pride, that hitherto the agents of corporations have been able . . . to carry through
the Legislature almost any measure which their principals deemed of sufficient
importance to spend money enough to carry.”); MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION
1917–19, 2:946–47 (“We have found that in our legislative bodies these organized
human selfish forces were very powerful and, indeed, at times were able to thwart
the will and judgment of the majority.”).
17. See Tarr, For the People, supra note 16, at 89–90.
18. See JOHN DINAN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: GOVERNING BY
AMENDMENT IN THE AMERICAN STATES (2018); Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin,
American Constitutional Exceptionalism Revisited, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 164, 1641
(2014); Christian G. Fritz, Alternative Visions of American Constitutionalism:
Popular Sovereignty and the Early American Constitutional Debate, 24 HASTINGS
CONST. L. Q. 287, 351 (1997).
19. See JOHN DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 29–
63 (2d ed. 2009).
20. See Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, Constitutions Un-Entrenched:
Toward an Alternative Theory of Constitutional Design, VA. PUB. L. & LEGAL
THEORY RSCH. PAPER SERIES 1, 2–8 (2016).
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guide state government in toto, we might expect those amendments to affect
all departments of state government, including state agencies.
My second argument is that careful review of state constitutional
amendments supports the expectation that they significantly impact state
agencies. The impacts of some amendments are obvious because they
explicitly address agency rules and decisions, or change administrative
structures and procedures.21 However, an overlooked impact on state
agencies comes from the myriad policy amendments that indirectly affect
agency work. For example, many amendments change statewide policies
that agencies are responsible for implementing, earmark funds for agencyrun programs, or prohibit state government (as a whole) from pursuing a
particular agenda.22 In these ways (and others) amendment actors are
exerting frequent and significant influence on both state agencies and
legislatures through political processes that are unique to the states. To
demonstrate and further explore this claim, I catalogue at least five ways
that amendments affect state agencies. This catalogue is an important
contribution because it begins the process of placing state agencies within
their true constitutional structure.
Finally, placing state agencies in their native environment enables a
more authentic assessment of their role and performance, as well as a more
nuanced evaluation of state constitutional theory and design. On the one
hand, this perspective reveals that state agencies are unlikely to be as
independent as their federal cousins. Popular intervention in state
government is too pervasive and frequent to afford agencies a truly
independent space. Indeed, it is not hyperbolic to suggest that no institution
in state government is as independent and entrenched as some federal
agencies appear to be. On the other hand, state agency business is vast and
most of it probably lacks the political salience or significance necessary to
trigger a constitutional amendment. This may create a degree of de facto
independence for state agencies, which perhaps illustrates the limits of state
constitutional theory and design. Direct democracy is likely too
cumbersome to effectively monitor the vast technical work of state
agencies. Thus, to the extent state agencies perform increasingly important
roles, state constitutional design may be ill-suited to monitoring that
expansion.
This essay proceeds in three Parts. Part I argues that state agencies
are differently situated than federal agencies because they operate within a
constitutional structure where frequent popular intervention is a dominant
accountability device. Part II surveys recent state constitutional
amendments and argues that they confirm that constitutional amendments
impact state agencies in a variety of under-appreciated and creative ways.

21. See infra Sections II.A–C (discussing various examples).
22. See infra Sections II.D–E (discussing various examples).
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Finally, Part III explores the implications of studying state agencies with
greater sensitivity to their authentic constitutional environment.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
Although there was early uncertainty regarding the constitutionality
of federal agencies, federal administrative law has generally coalesced
around a rather stable and enduring set of rules, norms, and practices. This
is, of course, a complex area of law, policy, and government that I cannot
fully describe here. My limited purpose is to show that oversight of federal
agencies is primarily oriented around a constellation of highly mediated and
rivalrous political processes that reflect the Federal Constitution’s
commitment to representative democracy and the separation of powers. To
be sure, the public has steadily assumed a more direct role in monitoring
federal agencies, but that monitoring is channeled back into representative
institutions, litigation, or informal pressure on agency officials through the
press. This stands in contrast to the states where agencies operate in an
environment that is subject to frequent popular lawmaking through
constitutional amendment. More importantly, state constitutional theory has
generally coalesced around the expectation that wayward government
officials and institutions will be corralled through constitutional
amendments.
In this section, I first provide a very general overview of the forms
of federal agency oversight. I then argue that state agencies should be
understood within the context of a different constitutional structure that
prioritizes frequent popular lawmaking through constitutional amendment
as an accountability mechanism, which has no analog at the federal level.
A. Federal Mechanisms of Agency Accountability
The Federal Constitution has a deep commitment to representative
democracy and the separation of powers as strategies for promoting good
governance, accountability, and liberty.23 James Madison is most often
attributed with these aspects of Federal Constitutional design. He viewed
majority tyranny as the greatest threat to liberty and good governance, and
he sought to arrange the federal government in ways that would mitigate
this risk. His first design idea was to reject direct democracy, which he
23. The founders intentionally (and emphatically) rejected direct democracy
in the Federal Constitution in favor of representative government and the
separation of powers. See James Madison, The Federalist Nos. 10, 49, 51, 53,
LIBR. CONG., https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/full-text [https://perma.cc/ZM
W6-P5T7] (last visited Jan. 2, 2021) [hereinafter LIBR. CONG.]; JOSEPH M.
BESSETTE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND
AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT (1994); Tarr, For the People, supra note 16,
at 88.
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believed was too easily manipulated by majority faction, in favor of
representative democracy.24 Representative democracy, according to
Madison, harmonized popular sovereignty with limitations on majority rule
by ensuring that popular preferences would be honored but mediated
through “wise” and “trustworthy” representatives who would consider a
plurality of interests and priorities.25 Madison also insisted on a careful
separation of powers that matched each power with a “counter-power.”26
The idea was that government accountability would be best served by
turning government on itself by incentivizing officials within government
to compete for power and therefore monitor each other’s behavior.27
Madison’s ideas about representative government and separation of
powers are at the core of how the Federal Constitution is designed, and they
frame the basic structure of how federal agencies are monitored. To be sure,
federal agency oversight is the object of a vast and complex literature that
spans disciplines.28 My discussion here will surely fall short of capturing
the nuance and richness of that literature. For present purposes, however,
my only observation regarding the many forms of federal agency oversight
is that they mostly funnel back into the Federal Constitution’s commitment
to representative democracy and the separation of powers.
Traditional accounts of federal agency oversight focus on the role
that constitutional actors (Congress, the President, and the courts) can play
in monitoring and controlling agencies.29 Congress, for example, has a
variety of options for overseeing and controlling agencies. It can eliminate,
restructure, redefine, or consolidate agencies by statute.30 Congress may
also enact statutes that override or effectively alter specific agency
regulations.31 Congressional oversight also occurs through confirmation and
impeachment powers, and through a variety of indirect methods such as
oversight investigations and funding decisions.32 Regardless of the method
of Congressional oversight, the core idea underlying traditional theories is
that Congress will have incentives to monitor and control agencies because
voters demand it or because Congress inherently aspires to grow its
power.33
24. This account comes primarily from Federalist 10, 49, 51, 53, 63. See LIBR.
CONG., supra note 23.
25. See KENNETH P. MILLER, DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE COURTS 19–21
(2009).
26. Id. at 21.
27. Id.
28. See Michaels, supra note 14, at 232.
29. See Seifter, supra note 11, at 108.
30. See Seifter, supra note 10, at 1548–51.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 1548–50.
33. See Michaels, supra note 14, at 248 (describing Congressional incentives
to monitor agencies).
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The President can also exert control over agencies. The President’s
authority over federal agencies largely turns on the degree of independence
that Congress gives to the agency.34 Under existing law, the President may
not formally direct the decisions of “independent agencies.”35 But the
President nevertheless has the power to appoint the leaders of those
agencies and remove them “for cause.”36 The President can extract more
loyalty from the leaders of executive (non-independent) agencies because
they serve at the pleasure of the President.37 Indeed, there is generally close
alignment between the President and these officials.38 Moreover, scholars
have noted a variety of informal influences that the President exerts over
agencies.39 Like Congress, the President is presumably motivated to exert
these forms of control over agencies because voters demand it or because
the President inherently aspires to consolidate power.40
The federal judiciary can also play a role in controlling agencies.
Although existing jurisprudence gives great deference to agencies, federal
courts nevertheless play an important role in enforcing legal limits on
agencies. By enforcing the Administrative Procedure Act and basic
constitutional norms, courts ensure that agencies comply with the law.
While the courts provide a forum for private parties to challenge certain
agency actions, the role of the courts remains squarely within the Federal
Constitution’s commitment to representative government and the separation
of powers. Private parties may raise objections to agency action, but the
validity of agency conduct is ultimately determined by the substance of
laws adopted by Congress or the Supreme Court’s construction of the
constitution. Indeed, the federal courts’ primary role is not to determine
regulatory substance, but to referee the administrative process and protect
against overreach.
Importantly, administrative law scholars have observed that a
variety of “subconstitutional” actors also contribute to monitoring and
controlling federal agencies.41 Various scholars have noted, for example,
that administrative agencies are not monolithic and that checks on agency
power can come from within those agencies – especially from career civil
servants who, unlike agency heads, are insulated from political influence
and have their own incentives to perform their duties in compliance with

34. See Seifter, supra note 10, at 1548–49.
35. See id. at 1549.
36. Id. at 1548–49.
37. See Michaels, supra note 14, at 245.
38. See id. at 245 n.60.
39. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 590–91 (1984).
40. See Michaels, supra note 14, at 245–46 (describing political incentives for
President to monitor agencies).
41. See Seifter, supra note 11, at 108.
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law and professional norms.42 Other scholars have emphasized that “civil
society” plays an increasingly important role in monitoring federal
agencies.43 Members of the public can, for example, demand agency
information, petition agencies to adopt or modify rules, comment on
proposed rules, and sue to challenge agency decisions.44 And, there are
strong incentives for civil society to monitor agencies because “invariably
some segment of the vast and diverse public will be adversely affected by
any change (or non-change) in administrative policy – and thus will” seek
to change that policy.45
Although these theories of agency accountability vary from
traditional accounts, it is important to recognize that they are still tied to the
Federal Constitution’s commitment to representative democracy and
separation of powers. The idea that federal agencies contain their own
internal checks and balances is compelling, but it ultimately rests on the
notion that “employing rivalrous institutional counterweights” can
“promote good governance, political accountability, and compliance with
the rule of law.”46 This, of course, is the core logic of the traditional
tripartite separation of powers embedded within the federal constitutional
structure. As a matter of constitutional design, it is nothing more than
Madison’s original belief that democracy and liberty are best protected by
pitting ambition against ambition within government.47
Similarly, the idea that civil society helps monitor federal agencies
should not be understood as an analog to direct public lawmaking. Indeed,
the tactics of civil society derive primary from the Federal Constitution’s
commitment to representative democracy. Citizens and interest groups who
seek administrative changes resort to lobbying government officials,
mobilizing fellow voters to interact with representatives, and notifying the
press in the hope of obtaining a change in agency policy.48 The public
42. See Michaels, supra note 14, at 237–38.
43. See Seifter, supra note 11, at 114–27 (describing literature on civil society
oversight of federal agencies).
44. See Michaels, supra note 14, at 239–41 (describing ways that the public
can engage with federal agencies).
45. Id. at 240.
46. Michaels, supra note 12, at 520.
47. See LIBR. CONG., supra note 23, at 51.
48. See Seifter, supra note 11, at 120–21 (describing how civil society
activities tap into executive official incentives). Of course, citizens can comment
on proposed rules and even petition an agency for a new rule. See Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c), (e) (2012). But agencies seem to pay little regard
to these public interventions, and they certainly have no legal obligation to do
anything more than rationally consider the public’s input. See Abbe R. Gluck et al.,
Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789,
1823–24 (2015) (“There is nothing akin to direct democracy on the [federal]
rulemaking side. . . . [Public] comments are not binding in the same way as a vote,
of course, and many agencies simply dismiss them as not being materially cogent
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surely plays an important role in monitoring federal agencies, but its role is
to enhance the performance of representative institutions by gathering
information, identifying public priorities, and orchestrating the agenda. In a
sense, Congress and the President have constructed a system that
outsources essential work to private groups that are most incentivized to
perform that work well.49
In short, the theory and practice of federal agency oversight has
developed around the Federal Constitution’s commitment to two core
accountability mechanisms: representative democracy and the separation of
powers. Regarding representative democracy, a variety of different tactics
and actors work to increase the political salience for Congress and the
President of agency decisions with the hope of changing agency policy or
performance. Regarding the separation of powers, both traditional theories
and new perspectives on agency accountability build on the basic notion
that government accountability can be enhanced by dividing government
into rivalrous institutions.
B. State Constitutional Amendment as an Accountability Mechanism
It is often presumed that Madison’s vision for the Federal
Constitution represents the authoritative perspective on American
constitutionalism.50 In truth, the states have purposefully diverged from
federal constitutional design in various respects. One of the most
fundamental points of divergence relates to Madison’s faith in
representative democracy and the separation of powers as effective
mechanisms for good governance.51 To be sure, state constitutions
incorporate representation and the tripartite separation of powers into their
constitutional structure. But they have designed those institutions around
various forms of direct democracy that reflect a deep distrust in
“government by elected representatives.”52 If there is a single thread that
connects state constitutions across jurisdictions and time, it is a populist
fear that government officials are prone towards capture and recalcitrance,
and that government accountability requires opportunities for the public to
vote on measures, not just candidates.
This idea is deeply embedded in state constitutional history and
theory. Alan Tarr has explained, for example, that the earliest state
constitutions went to great lengths to construct legislative power in ways
and thus not requiring a response.”).
49. See Michaels, supra note 14, at 248–50.
50. See Tarr, For the People, supra note 16, at 89.
51. Id. at 88–90.
52. See id. at 90; Elizabeth Garrett, Crypto-Initiatives in Hybrid Democracy,
78 S. CAL. L. REV. 985, 985 (2005) (arguing that states have created “hybrid”
democracies that are “neither wholly representative nor wholly direct, but a
complex combination of both.”).
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that approximated direct democracy.53 State legislators in both houses were
subject to annual elections, the lower houses was incredibly large in order
to reduce the size of elector districts and tighten the alignment between
constituent preference and their representatives, and the states widely
endorsed the practice of constituents formally instructing representatives
on how to vote on certain issues.54 The idea was that “representation was a
necessary evil” and that it should be structured to “replicate direct
democracy insofar as possible” with elected officials executing “the views
of the populace faithfully, rather than (as Madison recommended) refining
and enlarging those views.”55
In addition to the design of state legislatures, the grand American
invention of the constitutional convention came from the belief that direct
democracy processes were necessary to promote government
accountability.56 The convention was designed as a way for the people to
act directly and independently of government for the purpose of creating
constitutional law.57 Thus, the convention had very specific qualities. It
was called directly by the people, populated by delegates selected solely for
the temporary purpose of making constitutional law, and its work was
subject to a popular referendum.58 In state constitutional theory, the
convention is the purest institutional embodiment of popular sovereignty
because of its connection to the public without the mediation of existing
government.59 By the end of the eighteenth century, the convention was
well established as a workable form of direct democracy for the creation of
government, and it was fast becoming a vehicle for regular popular
intervention in existing government.60

53. See Tarr, For the People, supra note 16, at 90–92.
54. See id. at 91–92.
55. See id.
56. See generally Jonathan L. Marshfield, Forgotten Limits on the Power to
Amend State Constitutions, 114 NW. L. REV. 65 (2019) (discussing state
constitutional amendment procedures).
57. See id. at 88–105.
58. See Tarr, For the People, supra note 16, at 95–96; Marshfield, supra note
56, at 94–105.
59. See Marshfield, supra note 56, at 94–95. Delegates from many different
state constitutional conventions validate this understanding of the convention. See,
e.g., DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 104 (1864) (“[I]t is for the purpose of
sustaining the sovereign power in the hands of the people that this Convention is
assembled.”).
60. By the 1780s, a specially elected convention “had become such a firmly
established way of creating . . . a constitution that governments formed by other
means actually seemed to have no constitution at all.” WOOD, supra note 15, at
342. On the use of the convention to make constitutional amendments during much
of the nineteenth century, see TARR, supra note 16, at 136.
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The states’ alternative approach to constitutionalism was brought
into sharp relief during the economic crisis of 1837-39.61 Following that
collapse, many states were unable to meet their substantial debt
obligations,62 and it became clear to the public that state government had
adopted bad fiscal policies and programs that benefited a privileged
minority.63 In response, citizens in many states called constitutional
conventions and adopted detailed constitutional amendments that limited
state fiscal authority, especially the state’s ability to issue public debt.64
The convention debates from this period make clear that the amendments
reflected the public’s belief that direct popular intervention was necessary
to correct a failure by state government.65 By placing detailed instructions
and limitations in the constitution regarding fiscal policy, the public hoped
to better direct and control their representatives going forward.66
For present purposes, it is important to note that when scholars tell
the story of these provisions, they tend to empathize the popular backlash
against state legislatures and describe these provisions as responsive to
legislative failures.67 Legislatures were certainly to blame: they authorized
imprudent financing schemes that benefited wealthy private interests at the
public’s expense.68 However, what is often overlooked is that governors,
agency-like boards, and appointed state commissioners were also actively
involved in these failures.69 The state bureaucracy that administered public
finance during this period often failed in ways that legislatures had
anticipated and tried to control by statute.70 In many instances, the public

61. For a general discussion of how the economic crisis developed under state
constitutions and the amendments in response, see TARR, supra note 16, at 111–12,
and Richard Briffault, The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and State
Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L. J. 907, 911–12 (2003).
62. The authoritative record on these defaults and the structure of these debts
is BENJAMIN U. RATCHFORD, AMERICAN STATE DEBTS 73–104 (1941).
63. See John Joseph Wallis, Constitutions, Corporations, and Corruption:
American States and Constitutional Change, 1842 to 1852, 65 J. ECON. HIST. 211
(2005); TARR, supra note 16, at 112.
64. See Wallis, supra note 63, at 234.
65. See DINAN, supra note 18, at 164–71 (describing convention debates).
66. See id.; see also Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 20, at 3–7.
67. See, e.g., TARR, supra note 16, at 112 (“In its aftermath, state constitutions
were revised or amended to curtail legislative promotion of economic
development”); DINAN, supra note 18, at 164 (“The panic of 1837 also prompted
reconsideration of the wisdom of permitting unfettered legislative discretion”
regarding infrastructure development).
68. See Wallis, supra note 63, at 214.
69. See REGINALD C. MCGRANE, FOREIGN BONDHOLDERS AND AMERICAN
STATE DEBTS 8 (1935).
70. See id. at 8, 130; RATCHFORD, supra note 62, at 30, 88–92.
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was fully aware of these failures and outraged at the agencies as much as
the legislature.71
Indiana’s experience is illustrative. In 1836, the Legislature adopted
an internal improvement scheme.72 The Legislation created a nine-member
Board of Internal Improvements with the mandate to “locate” and
“superintend” construction of various projects, including the Wabash and
Erie Canal, railroads, and turnpikes.73 The Statute gave the Board the
power to issue up to $10 million in state debt to finance the projects.74 The
statute required the board to document its expenditures and debt issuance
and to report to the legislature regarding its business.75 The statute also
included various provisions designed to protect against conflicts of interest
on the board and to ensure transparency and accountability by the board.76
The board was appointed by the governor and confirmed by the Senate.77
Board members could be removed by impeachment or joint resolution of
the legislature.78
Notwithstanding the statute’s protective measures, the board was a
disaster that drove the state to an unprecedented default on its debt.79 The
failures came largely from the misconduct of board members who acted in
clear violation of the law.80Among other things, the board members “sold”
state bonds to banks in which they had a personal interest (often receiving a
personal commission from the bank).81 The sales were often closed at a
discount, meaning that the state incurred a larger debt that the cash it
obtained from the bond purchasers.82 Board members also used the
proceeds from the debt to finance lucrative construction contracts with
family and friends.83 An 1842 legislative investigation of the board
described one member’s conduct as “too grossly wrong to admit of
palliation, and too palpably indefensible to invite attack.”84 The committee
estimated that the state lost roughly 40% of the debt issued by the board.85
71. See, e.g., MCGRANE, supra note 69, at 132.
72. See id. at 130 (the so-called Mammoth Bill of 1836).
73. See 1836 Ind. Acts 6; see also MCGRANE, supra note 69, at 130.
74. See 1836 Ind. Acts 10.
75. See id. at 12.
76. See id. at 11, 20.
77. See id. at 6.
78. See id.
79. See MCGRANE, supra note 69, at 130 (“The prosecution of the public
works program brought the state to bankruptcy. The mismanagement and dishonest
of some of the state officials made this inevitable.”).
80. See id. at 130–32.
81. See id. at 131–32 (itemizing commissions received by one board member).
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 132 (quoting the report).
85. See id. (stating that there was $15 million total debt and only $859,300 in
proceeds received).
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The board’s misconduct was the source of great public outrage, and
the public called a convention in 1850 primarily to address public finance
issues.86 The convention ultimately adopted a provision that categorically
banned all state debt.87 The convention debates make clear that the debt
amendments were aimed at controlling state legislatures as well as state
agencies because both had contributed to the problem.88 The dominant
attitude at the convention was that the people needed to adopt specific
constitutional limitations that would tighten control over government
because errors and misconduct by legislatures, governors, and agencies
were likely to recur without those controls.89
The states’ response to the 1839 financial crisis was not an outlier.
Since then, states have used constitutional amendment more and more
frequently to address more and more specific issues.90 As of 2017, there
were more than 7,500 amendments to existing state constitutions, an
average of 150 amendments per state constitution.91 A recent empirical
study of these amendments found that they have significantly increased the
number of topics addressed in state constitutions as well as the degree of
specificity with which those topics are covered.92 Indeed, state constitutions
address issues from pregnant pigs and the width of ski slopes,93 to the death
penalty, environmental regulation, tobacco use, lotteries, marijuana, and
more.94
Underlying the growth of amendment practice is the theoretical
assumption that direct popular involvement is necessary to promote
government accountability.95 Indeed, state constitutional convention
debates are littered with this sentiment. As early as 1892, Amasa Eaton
wrote (disapprovingly) in the Harvard Law Review regarding state
constitutions that “the theory underlying them [is] that the agents of the
people, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, are not to be trusted, so
that it is necessary to enter into the most minute particulars as to what they
86. See Wallis, supra note 63, at 235.
87. See id. at 232.
88. See REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR
THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF INDIANA, vol. 1 at 687–89
(1850).
89. There were also arguments that the people were to blame and that
representation or a more entrenched constitution would have stopped the hasty
impulse. See id. at 917.
90. See Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 20, at 13–15.
91. DINAN, supra note 18, at 23.
92. See Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 20, at 13–15.
93. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 21 (pregnant pigs); N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 1
(ski slopes).
94. See generally EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG
PLACES: WHY STATE CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS 18–
35 (2013).
95. Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 20, at 13–17.
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shall not do.”96 Several recent qualitative studies have also confirmed that
state constitutional detail and length reflect a coherent theoretical approach
to constitutionalism that relies on popular involvement in governance to
promote accountability. Emily Zackin, for example, has found that positive
rights made their way into state constitutions because existing government
was non-responsive to popular labor, education, and environmental
policies.97 And, in the most extensive study of state constitutional
amendments to-date, John Dinan concludes that the states are essentially
“governed by amendment” as part of a strategy to, among other things,
compensate for and correct government failures.98
A few points of clarification are important here. First, the states
have become increasingly reluctant to call constitutional conventions.99 The
dominant approach to amendment now is by legislative referral and the
initiative.100 Although the convention may have played a significant role in
monitoring and checking agencies in the past, it does not perform that role
in contemporary state constitutionalism. Second, there is variation among
the states regarding the processes and practice of extra-conventional
amendment.101 Eighteen states have some form of citizen-initiated
amendment process.102 The initiative provides the public with the most
direct access to the constitution as an accountability device. Citizens can
mostly bypass government by drafting their own amendments and
qualifying them for a statewide referendum. In all other states,
constitutional amendments originate in the legislature, but are subject to a
statewide referendum (except Delaware where amendments pass to the
public in the form of an intervening legislative election).103 Thus, the
legislature has influence over the amendment process in many states, which
can limit its effectiveness as an accountability device (at least as compared
to a well-functioning initiative process).104
96. Amasa M. Eaton, Recent State Constitutions, 6 HARV. L. REV. 109, 121
(1892) (referenced in Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 20, at 16); see also William F.
Swinder, Missouri Constitutions: History, Theory and Practice, 23 MO. L. REV. 32
(1958) (explaining that state constitutions reflect attempts to control government
through detailed provisions and contrasting this to the “higher law” theory adopted
at the federal level).
97. See EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES:
WHY STATE CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS 1–17 (2013).
98. DINAN, supra note 18, at 270.
99. See id. at 30–31.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 11–34.
102. See id. at 17.
103. See id. at 14.
104. This is an important point that is often overlooked in studies addressing
state constitutionalism. It is not entirely clear whether frequent amendment reflects
popular involvement in constitutional politics or offensive activity by the
government to control politics. The answer to this is probably highly contextual.
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That said, the politics of legislature-referred amendments are
complex, and the process often empowers the public. For example, in at
least nine states, the legislature can propose amendments by a majority
vote.105 Thus, in those states, the legislature’s choice to act by statute or
amendment is based on considerations other than the number of votes
required for each. From a practical standpoint, the main difference is
whether the legislative action should be confirmed by the governor or by
the public in a referendum. A legislature might prefer to send a policy to the
public rather than the governor for various reasons. If the same political
party controls the legislature and the governorship, for example, that party
may want to avoid making a final decision on a politically contentious
issue. Constitutional amendment then becomes attractive as a method for
allowing the public to decide for itself. Alternatively, if the governor is
from a different party and she is likely to veto a contentious bill, then the
legislature may want to evade the veto by sending the issue directly to the
public. In either scenario, the system creates incentives for government to
send difficult issues to the public. These same dynamics exist even in states
with higher legislative thresholds for amendment.106 Indeed, various state
legislatures have pursued constitutional amendments as a strategy for
evading the governor’s veto.107
Moreover, once a state constitution begins to include specific
details relevant to policy and government administration, it forces the
legislature to pursue more and more amendments when new circumstances,
ideas, or values warrant a different approach. In other words, once a
constitution begins to include specifics, government officials will more
frequently need to seek voter permission to adjust those specifics in the
form of proposed amendments. Officials are likely to seek this permission if
popular preferences have changed and the public is now expecting
government to pursue a new course. In this way, even in states without the
initiative, governance is shifted (to some degree) to voters because officials
experience pressure to meet evolving public preferences in the face of many
detailed pre-existing constitutional constraints.
My limited point here is that, as compared to federal constitutional design, the
states have incorporated direct democracy into the amendment process as a way to
facilitate more popular involvement in government oversight. Moreover, as
described above, the public retains a great deal of influence over the legislativereferral process.
105. DINAN, supra note 18, at 14.
106. For example, in some states the legislative thresholds for overriding a
governor’s veto are higher than super-majority thresholds for proposing an
amendment.
107. See, e.g., John Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2011, in THE
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 3, 7–8 (2012)
(describing Missouri amendment regarding voter IDs that was proposed “as a way
of overcoming a 2011 gubernatorial veto”).
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In sum, state government has been designed around a commitment
to frequent popular intervention as a core accountability strategy. Thus, to
the extent state agencies stray from popular preferences and expectations,
we would expect to see state constitutional amendments that address that
misalignment. In other words, we would expect to see a degree of popular
regulation through constitutional amendment.
II. STATE AGENCIES AND AMENDMENT
In this section, I survey state constitutional amendments with an
eye towards understanding how they might affect state agencies.108 I find
that some amendments address state agencies and state administrative law
explicitly, but many amendments affect agencies indirectly in ways that are
often overlooked. I identify at least five different ways that the frequent
amendment of state constitutions has affected state agencies. Cataloguing
these impacts is a helpful first step in studying state agencies with due
regard for their unique institutional environment.
A. Amendments Explicitly Altering Administrative Procedure
The states have used constitutional amendment to make various
explicit changes to state administrative law.109 Indeed, on certain issues, the
states have been relatively active in reforming administrative law through
constitutional amendment in order to monitor and control agencies.110 Of
course, this is a phenomenon with no analog under the Federal Constitution
because federal administrative law is principally a product of legislation
and court rulings.
Since at least 1939, several states have adopted amendments that
allow legislatures to nullify or modify agency regulations by joint
resolution (the so-called legislative veto).111 At the federal level, Congress
also adopted the legislative veto, but in 1983 the Supreme Court held that it
was unconstitutional.112 In response to similar state supreme court rulings,
various states adopted constitutional amendments that secured or reinstated
108. For this survey, I draw primarily on the annual amendment reports
published by the Council of State Governments in the BOOK OF THE STATES. Those
reports include detailed descriptions of amendments proposed and adopted in the
states. I also rely on John Dinan’s exhaustive account of constitutional amendments
in the states contained in his two books. See DINAN, supra note 19; DINAN, supra
note 18. I further draw on Alan Tarr’s seminal work on the development of state
constitutional law. See Tarr, For the People, supra note 16. Other anecdotal
sources are mentioned in the notes as well.
109. See DINAN, supra note 18, at 56–59.
110. See id. at 47–48.
111. See id. at 58–59.
112. INS v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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the legislative veto in some form. Michigan and South Dakota established
joint legislative review commissions with the power to suspend agency
regulations while the legislature is out of session.113 A host of other states
adopted amendments that allow legislatures to nullify regulations (in whole
or in part) by resolution.114 The most recent of these amendments was
adopted in Idaho in 2016.115
The states have also adopted a variety of amendments related to
judicial review of agency action.116 Some states have amended their
constitutions to clearly establish a final judgment rule for review of agency
decisions and/or set the scope and standard of judicial review.117 Michigan
is unusual in that it amended its Constitution to allow judicial review of
certain non-final agency actions;118 although Michigan courts have imposed
an exhaustion requirement.119 Interestingly, some amendments have crafted
customized review processes based on the agency or substantive right at
issue.120 In Michigan, for example, decisions by the state Civil Rights
Commission must be reviewed de novo.121 A 1967 amendment to the New
Mexico Constitution requires that any decision by any state agency that
affects water rights must be reviewed by a court de novo.122 Likewise, a
very detailed 1941 amendment to the Oklahoma Constitution creates a right
of appeal directly to the Oklahoma Supreme Court for certain decision by
the Corporations Commission.123 That amendment also sets the court’s
scope and standard of review, and divests any other state court of
jurisdiction to hear appeals from the Corporation Commission.124

113. See DINAN, supra note 18, at 58–59.
114. Id. at 59. Arkansas’s amendment is unusual in that it states that
regulations do not become effective until reviewed by a legislative committee. See
id.
115. See id. at 59.
116. See id. at 56–58.
117. See MO. CONST. art. V, § 18 (adopted as amendment in 1976); see also
OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 3; N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 12.
118. See MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 28. The provision was added by the
convention of 1961 and it specifically addresses judicial review of agency actions.
See also TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3-b (1940 amendment that allows legislature to
create process for direct appeal to supreme court regarding validity of an
administrative order).
119. See, e.g., Judges of 74th Jud. Dist. v. Cnty. of Bay, 190 N.W.2d 219
(Mich. 1971).
120. See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (creating a review rule for decision by
the State Corporation Commission).
121. MICH. CONST. art. V, § 29 (review of decisions by civil rights commission
are to be reviewed in court “de novo”).
122. N.M. CONST. art. XVI, §5 (amendment adopted in 1967).
123. OKLA. CONST. art. IX, § 20 (amended by Laws 1941, p. 544, § 1).
124. See id.
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Two other amendments are worth mentioning because they further
illustrate the degree to which state amendments have explicitly monitored
and reformed state administrative procedure. In 1978, California adopted
an amendment that prohibited state agencies from “declaring a statute
unenforceable, or refusing to enforce a statute, on the basis of it being
unconstitutional unless an appellate court has made a determination that
such statute is unconstitutional.”125 More recently, a 2018 amendment to
the Florida Constitution that prohibits state courts from deferring to agency
interpretations of their respective enabling statutes and rules.126
In sum, state amendments have explicitly reformed administrative
procedure in a variety of ways. These amendments have often been
structured to limit agency independence and enhance legislative or judicial
review of agencies. In any event, the public in many states have been
involved in the monitoring and reform of administrative procedure in ways
that are not possible at the federal level.
B. Amendments Creating Agencies and Constitutionalizing Mandates
Amendments also impact state agencies in another way that has no
federal analog. Most states have explicitly constitutionalized at least one
agency or regulatory commission.127 The practice of creating state agencies
by constitutional amendment (rather than by statute) seems to have begun
in the late nineteenth century in response to concerns about legislative
capture by business interests, especially capture by railroads.128 However,
the practice has now evolved into a generalized strategy for enhancing
government accountability. The basic idea is that by stripping the
legislature of a discrete regulatory authority and placing that responsibility
instead with a specialized agency, regulation in that area will be more
visible to the public because of its isolation from other policy decisions and
its concentration in an identifiable body.129 Importantly, this strategy is not
125. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.5 (added by amendment in 1978).
126. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 21 (adopted by amendment in 2018) (“In
interpreting a state statute or rule, a state court or an officer hearing an
administrative action pursuant to general law may not defer to an administrative
agency’s interpretation of such statute or rule, and must instead interpret such
statute or rule de novo.”).
127. See Miriam Seifter, Understanding State Agency Independence:
Appendices, SSRN (Apr. 21, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3369026 [https://perma.cc/K5K4-LNTC].
128. DINAN, supra note 18, at 48.
129. To be sure, not all constitutionalized agencies serve this purpose. Some
share policy making authority with legislatures. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. IX, § 7
(creating constitutional Wildlife and Fisheries Commission to “control and
supervise[] the wildlife of the state” but stating that the “functions, duties, and
responsibilities of the commission, and the compensation of its members, shall be
provided by law.”). Additionally, legislatures generally retain fiscal authority,
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a nineteenth-century relic. It has been deployed recently in various contexts,
including amendments legalizing marijuana and amendments
constitutionalizing the right to hunt and fish.
This strategy is powerfully illustrated by California’s 1879
provision creating the first constitutional railroad commission.130 One of the
dominant arguments made in favor of constitutionalizing the commission
was that it would enhance government accountability to the public. 131
Because of effective lobbying by railroads, the legislature had frequently
worked to undermine statutory commissions to the detriment of the public
and the benefit of the railroads.132 Moreover, legislatures were often
effective in obscuring their malfeasance because legislative work was “too
much distributed to secure the rigid scrutiny of the public.”133 Thus,
convention delegates proposed a constitutional provision that would shift
responsibility for regulating railroad rates from the legislature to a threemember commission.134 John Wickes, a delegate to the 1878 California
convention, argued that the three-member commission should be
constitutionalized because “responsibility is so localized in this triumvirate
that the light of public scrutiny can be concentrated upon it in an intense
form.”135 Similarly, N.G. Wyatt argued at the same convention: “I []want
the Commission above the Legislature, practically speaking. I want the
Commission so that they can act responsive to the behests of the people,
and not the Legislature.”136
Another example of constitutional agencies as an accountability
strategy is the creation of fish and game commissions. Beginning with
Louisiana’s 1921 provision constitutionalizing the Department of
Conservation, various states opted to constitutionalized agencies with
responsibility for managing and regulating the state’s wildlife and natural
resources.137 These amendments (several of which were adopted by the
initiative) were in response to public perceptions that legislatures and

which provides them with residual ways to undermine or empower agencies. See
ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 309–10
(2009). But even here, the idea was to prevent the legislature from completely
eliminating the agency or changing its structure. See DINAN, supra note 18, at 55–
56; James W. Fesler, Independence of State Regulatory Agencies, 34 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 935 (1940).
130. See DINAN, supra note 18, at 48, 51.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 51–52 (the statutory commission was sabotaged and eventually
eliminated by the legislature).
133. See id. at 49, 51.
134. See id. at 49–50.
135. See id. at 50 (quoting convention debates).
136. Id. at 52.
137. See id. at 52, 54.
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governors had failed to protect natural resources from powerful business
interests.138
Missouri’s amendment creating a Conservation Commission is
especially illustrative. In 1935, during the “low point in conservation
history,” “unregulated hunting, fishing and trapping, and unrestrained
timber harvest, had decimated natural resources.”139 Although many state
legislatures had created conservation commissions by statute, “instead of
protecting wildlife, laws often served the very interest that were responsible
for despoiling wildlife resources.”140 Consequently, a group of Missouri
“hunters and anglers” organized and drafted a citizens initiative amendment
that created the Conservation Commission with exclusive power to manage,
restore, conserve, and regulate the State’s wildlife, forestry, and lands used
for wildlife preservation.141 The amendment specifically prohibited the
Legislature from enacting any laws “inconsistent with the provisions of this
amendment and all existing laws inconsistent herewith shall no longer
remain in force or effect.”142 The amendment has been interpreted to grant
the Commission “exclusive authority over fish and wildlife.”143 It was
approved by voters in 1936 by the largest margin of any other amendment
up to that time.144
Other examples of this phenomenon abound. For example, Oregon
adopted a citizen-initiated amendment in 1984 that created a state lottery
and established a commission to regulate the lottery.145 The Legislature was
apparently unwilling to take up the lottery issue, and the amendment
requires the Commission to “establish and operate a State Lottery” and
grants the Commission rule-making authority.146 Moreover, various states
have constitutionalized education agencies in order to insulate education

138. See id. at 54–55.
139. Jim Low, The Genesis of Conservation in Missouri, in 66 MO.
CONSERVATIONIST 13 (2005).
140. See id.
141. MO. CONST. art. XIV, § 16 (1875).
142. Id.
143. Low, supra note 139, at 14.
144. Id.
145. See OR. CONST. art. XV, § 4; Norma Paulus, Or. Voters’ Pamphlet 3, 21
(Oct. 19, 1984).
146. OR. CONST. art. XV, § 4. A similar scenario occurred in 2000 in Oregon.
After the legislature failed to adopt a regulatory scheme for in-home care givers,
citizens proposed and adopted an amendment that constitutionalized the Home
Care Commission. See Bill Bradbury, Or. Voters’ Pamphlet 197 (2000) (explaining
that amendment was in response to legislative inaction); see OR. CONST. art. XV, §
11. See also John Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2009, in THE
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 8 (2010) (describing
Ohio amendment legalizing casinos and creating the “Ohio Casino Control
Commission”).
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policy and administration from legislative interference.147 Many states have
also used amendments to create legislative ethics commission to respond to
a perception that legislatures are ineffective as self-regulation.148 Finally,
when Oklahoma adopted a constitutional amendment to include a right to
hunt and fish in 2008, the amendment also adjusted the mandate of the
Wildlife and Conservation Commission to ensure that “traditional methods,
practices and procedures shall be allowed for taking game and fish” so long
as the wildlife is not endangered.149 This change was adopted out of fear
that the legislature or the commission might be inclined to overregulate
hunting and fishing.150
One further example is helpful because it illustrates the continuing
relevance of this approach. The use of constitutional amendments to
legalize marijuana have occurred primarily because legislatures have not
independently responded to public preferences.151 In order to ensure that
legislatures do not undermine these amendments, some states have included
within the amendments the agencies and regulatory framework necessary to
legalize marijuana. The 2016 Arkansas amendment, for example, created
147. See CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 9 (creating The Regents of the University of
California and declaring that it “shall be entirely independent of all political or
sectarian influence and kept free therefrom in the appointment of its regents and in
the administration of its affairs”); ANN M. LOUSIN, THE ILLINOIS STATE
CONSTITUTION 235–36 (2011) (noting that Illinois State Board of Education was
constitutionalized for this purpose); WILLIAMS, supra note 129, at 310 (describing
this phenomenon for the regulation of higher education through constitutional
boards of regents).
148. See John Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2010, in THE
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 3, 8 (2011)
(describing 2011 Utah amendment creating legislative ethics commission); see also
DINAN, supra note 18, at 253–55 (describing these commissions as responsive to
legislative failures).
149. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 36 (right to hunt and fish); OKLA. CONST. art.
XXVI, § 1–2 (constitutionalizing Wildlife Commission).
150. See Jeffrey Omar Usman, The Game is Afoot: Constitutionalizing the
Right to Hunt and Fish in the Tennessee Constitution, 77 TENN. L. REV. 57, 83
(2009) (quoting prominent supporter of amendment who describe the amendment
as “a preemptive strike . . . making it more difficult for any nutty animal rights
activist or anti-hunting organization to target Oklahoma . . . . So if state lawmakers
were to go insane and wanted to eliminate deer hunting, for example, it couldn’t be
done without a vote of the people.”). New Jersey includes another compelling
example. In 1995, votes approved an amendment that created the Council on Local
Mandates. See State of New Jersey Council on Local Mandates, OFFICIAL SITE OF
THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, https://www.state.nj.us/localmandates/. The Council is
independent and was created to monitor legislative mandates to local government
that imposed unfunded obligations. It was intended to ensure that decisions
regarding unfunded mandates were decided separate from other issues and outside
ordinary institutions to ensure greater public exposure and scrutiny.
151. DINAN, supra note 18, at 242–43.
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the Medical Marijuana Commission to administer and regulate the licensing
of cultivation and dispensary facilities.152 It also gave specific directives to
existing state agencies (Department of Health and the Alcoholic Beverage
Control Commission) to adopt rules for the regulation of medical
marijuana.153 The amendment also included an unusual provision that
allowed the legislature to modify some of its implementation provisions
with a two-thirds vote “so long as the amendments are germane to this
section and consistent with its policy and purpose.”154 The amendment was
a masterwork in constitutionalizing administrative agencies and regulatory
mandates to constrain the Legislature.155
Finally, state courts have been attentive to the significance of
constitutionalized agencies as a mechanism for promoting government
accountability. For example, in 1968 a Florida man was arrested for hunting
on Sunday in violation of a Florida statute.156 The statute conflicted with a
rule promulgated by the Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission that
permitted hunting every day of the week during “open season.”157 The
Supreme Court of Florida held that the statute was invalid because “the
people by constitutional amendment placed in the hands of the Commission
the responsibility to fix hunting seasons.”158
The state practice of constitutionalizing agencies can appear odd
and chaotic. However, when examined with sensitivity to state
constitutional theory, a more coherent and rational picture emerges.
Constitutional agencies are often a product of the state commitment to
direct popular involvement in governance. These amendments reflect an
effort to make particular areas of state policy more salient and visible by
concentrating their regulation in a specialized body. They also reflect an
effort to circumvent or limit legislative inaction or recalcitrance by
transferring authority from the legislature to an agency.
C. Amendments Adjusting Agency Authority or Structure
State amendments also impact agencies by adjusting their structure
or powers. These amendments are partially the result of constitutionalizing
152. ARK. CONST. amend. 98, § 19.
153. Id. § 4 (Dept. Health).
154. Id. § 23.
155. California’s 2004 Stem Cell amendment is similar. See DINAN, supra note
18, at 245–46. It created the California Institute for Regenerative Medicine with
responsibility for encouraging research in CA with grants and loans.
156. Whitehead v. Rogers, 223 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1969).
157. Id. at 331.
158. Id. at 331; see also Griffin v. Sullivan, 30 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 1947) (holding
that Wildlife Commission rules trump statutes); Peterson v. N.D. Univ. Sys., 678
N.W.2d 163, 168–69 (N.D. 2004) (addressing constitutional status of agencies and
judicial review).
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certain agencies. Amendments that use the constitution to create and
structure agencies necessarily introduce a degree of rigidity into agency
reform. Thus, as states identify the need to update or reform constitutional
agencies, they have responded with additional amendments making those
adjustments.
It is important to note two things in this regard. First, although
these amendments can seem inconsequential or inefficient, they are often
consistent with state constitutionalism’s underlying rationale. If an agency
was initially constitutionalized because the legislature was non-responsive
to public preferences, then it makes sense for the public to retain control
over the evolution of that agency. Forcing the public to vote directly on
seemingly trivial agency reforms helps protect against the legislature
unilaterally re-capturing the agency and undoing the purpose of the initial
amendment.159
The most obvious illustrations here are amendments adjusting the
selection process for commission and board members. In 2010, for
example, Hawaii voters approved an amendment that eliminated elections
for members of the state board of education (a constitutionally created
board), and authorized the governor to appoint the members subject to
confirmation by the senate.160 This change obviously shifts accountability
pathways for the board in significant ways, and took power away from
voters. It makes sense, therefore, that the change had to be approved by
voters. Other examples relate to agency authority. A 2012 Georgia
amendment, for example, specifically authorized state and local school
boards to create charter schools because of public backlash from a court
ruling denying the boards that power.161And a 2007 Texas amendment
empowered agencies to dispose of state property acquired by eminent
domain.162
Second, amendments adjusting agency structure and authority can
help promote agency accountability. This is especially true of initiative
amendments, but it can also occur though legislative proposal if public
outcry against an agency is sufficient to capture the legislature’s attention.
A 2008 Louisiana amendment, for example, was proposed by the legislature
159. Of course, legislatures may capitalize on voter confusion or ignorance to
slowly erode constitutional agencies through legislature-referred amendments.
160. Dinan, supra note 148, at 3, 9.
161. John Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2012, in THE COUNCIL
OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 3, 10 (2013).
162. See John Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2007, in THE
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 3, 6 (2008). For an
extreme example of agency restructuring, Kentucky adopted an amendment in
2001 that eliminated the railroad commission. See Janice C. May, State
Constitutional Developments in 2000–01, in THE COUNCIL OF STATE
GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 3, 8 (2002); see also MO. CONST. art. 1,
§ 21 (prohibiting agencies from issuing fines or imprisonment).
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and imposed term limits on officials serving on ten different state
commissions and boards to enhance accountability.163
Finally, I also include in this category amendments that alter the
authority or structure of statutory agencies. From time to time, amendments
have responded to concerns that agencies have assumed government
powers that are inappropriate for agencies or that the legislature has
impermissibly creeped into agency affairs. For example, Rhode Island
adopted a “separation of powers” amendment in 2004 that was principally
responsive to public concern that acting legislators were serving on
regulatory boards and commissions.164 These amendments obviously affect
agencies in significant ways because they limit the types of action and
policies that an agency can pursue. These amendments can also reflect an
effort by amendment actors to protect against the expansion of agency
authority or legislative encroachment.
D. Amendments Indirectly Affecting Agency Policy
The above categories have mostly described amendments that
explicitly address state agencies in some way. However, a significant but
largely overlooked impact on state agencies is the myriad policy
amendments that do not explicitly address state agencies. As noted above,
since at least the mid-nineteenth century, the states have used constitutional
amendment to manage and guide public policy; especially when the public
perceives a misalignment between government policy and popular
preferences. These amendments rarely address state agencies or state
administrative law, but they often have immediate and far-reaching effects
on agencies. Moreover, they can be responsive to unpopular policies or
practices by state agencies.
To illustrate how policy amendments can impact state agencies in
important but indirect ways, consider the extreme example of Florida’s
2000 high speed rail amendment. For decades, Floridians have pressured
government to construct a high-speed rail system that would connect the
state’s major metropolitan areas.165 By 2000, there had been multiple
legislative commissions, reports, investigations, and failed statutes.166 The
final straw in public sentiment appears to have been a conservative and
163. See John Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2008, in THE
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 3, 8 (2009).
164. See R.I. CONST. art. III, § 6; see also Robert F. Williams, Rhode Island's
Distribution of Powers Question of the Century: Reverse Delegation and Implied
Limits on Legislative Powers, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 159, 166 (1999)
(describing practice in Rhode Island before amendment).
165. See Allison L. C. De Cerreno et al., High-Speed Projects in the United
States: Identifying the Elements for Success-Part 1, MTI Report 05–01, MINETA
TRANSP. INST. PUBL’NS, Oct. 1, 2005, at 28, 29.
166. Id. at 29–30.
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incremental plan developed by the Florida Department of Transportation
that would have extended ordinary rail service across the state over three,
multi-year phases.167 As a result of this plan, frustrated citizens took to the
initiative and proposed a constitutional amendment that would require the
government to create a high-speed rail system by a date certain.168 The
amendment was ratified by voters, and it required construction to begin by
“November 1, 2003” on a “high speed ground transportation system . . .
capable of speeds in excess of 120 miles per hour” and connecting “the five
largest urban areas of the State.”169 The amendment did not mention any
agencies, but required “the Legislature, the Cabinet and the Governor” to
deliver the rail system.170
Within six months of the amendment, the Legislature adopted the
Florida High-Speed Rail Authority Act, which essentially passed the
constitutional policy mandate on to state agencies in various ways.171 First,
it created a new nine-member board called the Florida High Speed Rail
Authority (hereinafter “FHSRA”).172 The FHSRA was charged with
locating, planning, designing, financing, constructing, maintaining, owning,
operating, administering, and managing a high-speed rail system capable of
speeds in excess of 120 mph.173 The statute also placed the FHSRA within
the Department of Transportation for administrative purposes, but with
independence from the Secretary of Transportation. The statute further
directed that several other state agencies (Environmental Protection,
Transportation Commission, etc.) were required to assist the FHSRA.
Thus, the amendment indirectly spawned an entirely new state agency,
reversed the course of the existing agency, and re-arranged the
responsibilities of various other agencies.
Michigan’s stem-cell research amendment provides another helpful
example. In 2008, voters approved an amendment legalizing stem cell
research following longstanding legislative opposition notwithstanding
growing popular support.174 The amendment not only legalized stem cell
research, but it imposed various specific regulations on the research.175 Per
the amendment, “no stem cells may be taken from a human embryo more
than fourteen days after cell division begins” except that the “time during
which an embryo is frozen does not count.”176 The amendment also
167. See id. at 37.
168. See id. at 38.
169. See id. at 38–39 (re-printing amendment).
170. See id. The amendment was subsequently repealed by another initiative in
2004. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 19.
171. See De Cerreno, supra note 165, at 39.
172. Id. at 39 n.75 (citing to FLA. STAT. § 341.822 (2001)).
173. Fla. Stat. § 341.822 (2001).
174. See DINAN, supra note 18, at 245.
175. See MICH. CONST. art. I, § 27.
176. See id. § 27(2)(a).
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imposes specific, regulation-like limitations on when embryos created for
the purpose of fertility treatment can be used for research.177 Finally, the
amendment prohibits any state laws (and presumably regulations) that
would “discourage” stem cell research or “create disincentives for any
person to engage in or otherwise associate with such research or therapies
or cures.”178
These examples are not outliers. It is hard to overstate how
intrusive policy amendments can be for state agencies. Voters have, for
example, micromanaged the legalization and regulation of gaming and
lotteries by constitutional amendment.179 In the education context, voters
have adopted amendments setting class-sizes for K-12 public schools,180
regulating the power of state universities to charge tuition,181 and setting
spending priorities.182 Regarding animal rights, voters have approved
amendments regulating the types of permissible fishing nets,183 the
conditions of pregnant pigs,184 and the methods of trapping and hunting.185
Other regulation-like amendments have set the size of alcohol containers in
South Carolina,186 the length and width of ski slopes on particular
mountains in New York,187 and the documents a borrower should receive at
closing on a residential mortgage in Texas.188
One final phenomenon is worth noting here. Amendment actors
have increasingly used state constitutional rights to push back against fears
or perceptions of overregulation. These amendments do not contain as
much detail as the examples listed above, but they are often “framed less as

177. See id. § 27(2)(b).
178. See id. § 27(2)(d).
179. See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 6(c) (regulating the hours of operation
of casinos and the location and number of casinos).
180. Dinan, supra note 148, at 9–10.
181. See id. at 10 (Idaho).
182. See John Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2013, in THE
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 6–7 (2014)
(Colorado).
183. See DINAN, supra note 18, at 246 (California and Florida).
184. See id.
185. See id. at 246–47 (Colorado amendment stating that it is “unlawful to take
wildlife with a leghold trap, any instant kill body-griping design trap, or by poison
or snare.”).
186. A South Carolina amendment in 1973 limited alcohol to two-ounce
containers for certain distributors and one-ounce for other distributors. A 2004
amendment removed the two-ounce limitations and gave the legislature the power
to regulate the size of the containers.
187. See N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 1 (1938) (amended in 1957 to first include
ski-slope measurements).
188. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a), (g), and (t) (amendment adopted in
2007).

2021]

POPULAR REGULATION?

369

rights-protective measures than as policy-exhortation measures.”189
Georgia’s 2006 amendment, for example, provides: “The tradition of
fishing and hunting and the taking of fish and wildlife shall be preserved for
the people and shall be managed by law and regulation for the public
good.”190
All of this constitutional policy undoubtably trickles down in
significant ways to the responsible agencies. More fundamentally, the
frequent use of constitutional amendment to make detailed policy results in
a very different institutional environment for state agencies. Like federal
agencies, state agencies must be attentive to legislative changes. However,
state agencies must also conform to voter-approved policies, which are
often the result of a misalignment between the public and the legislature
regarding a particular policy.191 State agencies operate in a dynamic and
complex policy environment that includes multiple sources of changing
(sometimes conflicting) policy. This could have various affects in state
agency independence and performance. It could, for example, have a
paralyzing effect on agencies because it creates uncertainty. It could also
enhance public accountability if agencies look to conform to public
preferences to avoid responsive amendments. Alternatively, it could have
negative consequences for the rule of law if agencies find the law too
indefinite and fluid to pursue compliance. In any event, state amendments
likely present a unique constraint on agencies that should be addressed
when analyzing state administrative law and theory.
E. Finance Amendments and Agency Outcomes
There is a general understanding in administrative law and theory
that legislatures and executives can exert informal influence on agencies
through budgetary controls.192 At the federal level, these processes are
surely complex because they implicate a morass of opaque executive and
congressional bureaucracy.193They are, however, ultimately driven by the
President or Congress as the constitutional actors that can monitor and

189. See DINAN, supra note 18, at 105.
190. GA. CONST. art. I, § 1 para. XXVIII; see also N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 29
(“right to farm” provides “ . . . No law shall be enacted which abridges the right of
farmers and ranchers to employ agricultural technology, modern livestock
production and ranching practices.”); Usman, supra note 150, at 82–84 (describing
right to hunt and fish in these terms); DINAN, supra note 18, at 91–94 (describing
right to bear arms).
191. Of course, they must also be attentive to changes in federal law which can
similarly affect their responsibilities.
192. See Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget as a Source of Agency
Policy Control, 125 YALE L. J. 2182 (2016).
193. See id.
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control federal agencies within some variation of the traditional separation
of powers scheme.
State constitutionalism presents a unique complication to the ways
that funding can impact agencies. The states have a long and enduring
practice of using state constitutional amendments to manage the collection
and allocation of state funds. Indeed, amendments addressing state finance
are usually the largest category of amendments across the states. In this
section, I draw attention to a few illustrative ways that amendment actors
can impact state agencies through finance amendments.
First, amendment actors can protect agencies from the governor
and/or the legislature by earmarking funds for specific agencies or
programs.194 This strategy is an extension of state constitutionalism’s basic
premise that frequent popular intervention is an effective accountability
device. By using the constitution to allocate certain funds to agencies,
voters can protect against defunding by the legislature or governor, and,
therefore, facilitate the performance of preferred agencies. The corollary of
this is that voters gain a degree of continuing control over agencies as
funding is constitutionalized.
By way of example, voters in several states have adopted
amendments dedicating funds to conservation programs managed by state
agencies.195 In 1976, Missouri voters approved an amendment that
increased the sales tax “for the purpose of providing additional moneys to
be expended and used by the conservation commission” for the “control,
management, restoration, conservation, and regulation of . . . forestry and
wildlife resources of the state.”196 Minnesota adopted a similar amendment
that earmarked funds for various conservation efforts on a program-byprogram basis.197 In effort to realize the underlying strategy of the
amendment, it included a provision saying: “The dedicated money under
this section must supplement traditional sources of funding for these
purposes and may not be used as a substitute.”198 There are many other
examples, including: amendments dedicating gas taxes to transportation
departments for road improvement,199 lottery proceeds to education
departments,200 and cigarette taxes to health programs.201

194. See DINAN, supra note 18, at 258 (noting that these amendments are
result of public dissatisfaction with legislature budgeting).
195. See id. at 257.
196. See ARK. CONST. amend. 75 (adopted 1996) (specifically allocating funds
from tax to Arkansas Game and Fish Commission and the Department of Parks and
Tourism).
197. MINN. CONST. art. XI, § 15.
198. Id.
199. See DINAN, supra note 18, at 258.
200. See id.
201. See id. at 257 (California and Colorado).
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Second, voters can use constitutional amendment to regulate
agency authority to incur state debt. These amendments can operate to
constrain agencies that the public perceives to have overstepped by
incurring impermissible debt. Amendments can also be used to grant
agencies special authority to incur debt that state government does not
generally enjoy. In either case, the public exerts control over agency
funding and performance by constitutionalizing public debt authority.
Finance amendments further illustrate how state constitutionalism
presents a unique institutional environment for agencies. Funding for
agencies is often affected by constitutional amendments that earmark funds
for specific agency programs, which can empower some agencies and
programs and subject them to continuing popular review as funding
adjustments must now pass through constitutional amendment procedures.
Similarly, amendments can be used to control agency debt authority in
ways that influence agency performance.
III. ASSESSING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF “POPULAR REGULATION”
In this essay, I have argued that state agencies operate in a unique
institutional environment and that state constitutional amendment practice
is an important but overlooked factor in that environment. Having explored
some of the ways that state amendments can affect state agencies, it is now
possible to begin a more authentic and constructive assessment of state
agencies within their native environment as well a critical assessment of
state constitutional theory and design. My analysis here will necessarily be
incomplete and speculative. More work is necessary to fully assess these
issues. My modest goal in this section is to suggest a few lines of future
inquire that spring from the contextualization of state agencies that I have
advanced in this essay.
First, state agencies seem to be more susceptible to direct popular
intervention than federal agencies. To be sure, civil society plays a role in
monitoring federal agencies, but that role is mostly supplemental to
Congress and the President. In the states, the public often responds to
agency action and policy with detailed amendments that significantly affect
agency rules, priorities, and funds. It is possible that this public intervention
helps hold agencies accountable in ways that have no analog at the federal
level. The corollary of this is that state agencies are unlikely to enjoy the
degree of entrenchment and independence experienced by federal agencies
because state constitutionalism provides accessible opportunities for public
oversight and involvement.
That said, there are surely practical limitations on this form of
agency accountability (or “non-independence”). As Miriam Seifter has
observed in her study of civil society oversight in the states, it may be more
difficult for the public to monitor state agencies because of a lack of state
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watchdog groups or state-oriented press.202 Relatedly, the work of state
agencies is vast and much of it lacks the degree of political salience
necessary to trigger a constitutional amendment (even in the states).
However, my analysis in this essay suggests a different, stateoriented point of view. As explained above, not all state agencies are
similarly situated. Some state agencies ascend to constitutional status
because of significant public interest in a particular topic and the
legislature’s failure to act. State conservation commissions, for instance,
seem to have great political salience with a variety of organized state-level
interest groups. By constitutionalizing those agencies and siphoning
conservation policy into a specialized agency, state constitutionalism may
actually enhance the salience of conservation policy and administration.
Indeed, one of the objectives behind the creation of constitutional agencies
was to separate an issue from the opaque “sausage making” that occurs
during the legislative process so that the public could monitor it more
closely.
Thus, although it may be true that civil society oversight of state
agencies will never ascend to the levels experienced by federal agencies,
placing state agencies in their authentic institutional environment suggests
that this may not be the most relevant comparison. Perhaps a more fruitful
inquiry is to explore how state agencies can be used to enhance the salience
of state governance on a particular issue compared to the obfuscation
produced by the ordinary legislative process. The state experience with
agencies suggests that this might be a worthwhile endeavor.
Second, state agencies may offer a critique of state constitutional
theory and design. State constitutional design is committed to the idea that
government accountability includes recurring opportunities for direct
popular intervention. This commitment likely explains why state
constitutions are amended so frequently and with so much statutory-like
detail. As government has diverged from popular preferences, the public
has intervened with new constitutional text intended to bring government
back into alignment with the public. However, to the extent state
governance is increasingly handled by low-visibility agencies who operate
in routine and bureaucratic ways, direct democracy may be too
cumbersome to effectively monitor and correct government policy and
administration. Thus, agencies may experience a degree of de facto
independence that state constitutional design has not fully reckoned with.
CONCLUSION
State agencies occupy an increasingly significant position in
American governance. It is important, therefore, that they receive more
focused scholarly attention. However, as scholars engage with state
202. See Seifter, supra note 11, at 110–12.
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agencies, it is equally important that they recognize that state agencies
operate in very different institutional environments than federal agencies.
Rigorous study of state agencies requires careful attention to the ways that
state constitutional design and theory have affected state administrative law
and practice. My goal in this essay is to draw attention to the highly
contextual nature of state agencies and to emphasize the impact that state
constitutional amendment has on state governance.

